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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the impact of strike action on the stock market in SA, particularly 
the company share price. In recent years, SA has seen a steady increase in strike actions 
related to wage increases, which have generally been of short duration. The study is 
conducted by computing abnormal returns and subsequently cumulative abnormal 
returns for listed companies that had experienced strikes between 2003 and 2009. 
 
The sample included 49 listed companies on Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The results 
of the study reveal that stock prices react negatively to the news of a strike action five 
days prior to the strike and continue on a downward trajectory approximately 5 days 
post the strike action. The study finds that JSE is not an efficient market as  it takes days 
for the market to return to equilibrium after an announcement. 
 
The research observed that there were numerous factors that influence the occurrence 
of strikes/industrial actions in South Africa namely; SA’s political history, trade unions 
irrational behaviour, information asymmetry and economic climate among other factor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The democratic government of South Africa in 1994 inherited a discriminatory socio-
economic system and a disorganised politico-administrative framework. Yet the 
expectations for this government to deliver an improved quality of life are immense. 
The question is whether the state has the capacity to realise these expectations (Luiz, 
2002). 
 
The government has implemented programmes in a broad attempt to improve 
economic performance and eradicate the consequences of the previous political regime. 
The initiatives include RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme), GEAR 
(Growth, Employment and Redistribution) and the latest, NGP (New Growth Plan).  
 
The RDP policy aimed to provide the basic services to the previously disadvantaged 
communities, which included jobs, housing, water, electricity and telecommunications. 
In terms of social security, the RDP achieved some remarkable results. Owing to 
mismanagement of funds, however, the RDP was officially closed in 1996. Blumenfeld 
(1996) attributes the failure of the RDP to conceptual uncertainties, lack of funding, 
institutional uncertainties, ideological struggles and implementation failures. 
 9
 
GEAR represented a paradigm shift and implied that economic development in South 
Africa should be led by the private sector; the state should play a smaller role in the 
economy; state-owned assets should be privatised; there should be deep cuts in 
government spending; and that social service delivery budgets were to be prioritised. 
Concurrently those social services that could not be provided to all, or that could be 
undertaken more effectively by the private sector such as social assistance grants, were 
to be eliminated or scaled down. GEAR did not live up to all the expectations of its 
planners of enhance growth, employment or redistribution. In the period 1996 to 2001 
the economy grew by only 2.7 per cent instead of 6 percent as originally envisaged, and 
employment shrank by 3 per cent (Visser, 2009). 
 
Despite government efforts to implement a welfare system that benefits all, South 
Africa (SA) remains a particularly unequal society with regard to wages and living 
standards because most of government’s initiatives fail. It is not inconceivable that the 
increase in the number of strike actions related to service delivery and wage disputes is 
caused not only by low wages but also by a big wage gap between the black and white 
population groups. This study investigates the impact of the increased strike actions on 
the stock market (company share price).  
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This first chapter consists of six sections. Section 1.2 provides a brief background on SA’s 
transition to democracy. Section 1.3 presents the research problem. Section 1.4 
presents the research aim and objectives of the study. Section 1.5 presents the research 
questions, and Section 1.6 focuses on the rationale for the study. 
 
1.2 Background 
SA experienced political instability for a prolonged period owing to racial segregation. 
The linchpin of the apartheid political, economic and social regime was the purposive 
control and manipulation of the labour market in a manner which privileged the white 
minority while disadvantaging and discriminating against the black majority (Presidential 
Commission, 1996). The apartheid regime formally ended with the elections in 1994. 
Prior to 1994, African and white workers received average wages that differed by a 
factor of 5, although part of that gap, roughly half according to one assessment, can be 
accounted for by differences in race, in years of education and in location (Schultz and 
Mwabu, 1998).  
 
Trade unions, particularly Congress of South African Trade Union COSATU, played a 
pivotal role in narrowing the wage gap between races in SA while most SA unions which 
emerged in the aftermath of the 1973 strikes sought to prevent a concentration of 
power in the hands of officials by building a tradition of ‘worker control’ and 
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accountability of leadership to their members, particularly through a system of 
mandated decision making and regular reports. These unions de-emphasised the role of 
the union official and instead encouraged a tradition in which workers and elected shop 
floor worker leaders played a prominent role in decision making within the unions. 
 
COSATU was founded in 1985 and is the biggest of the three main trade union 
federations in SA. The union played a leading role in the struggle against apartheid, 
organising a range of highly effective wage strikes and also general strikes (termed 
‘stayaway action’, which is an industrial action by a group of employees in the form of 
absenting themselves from work without permission in support of some socio-political 
or socio-economic issue which does not relate to their employment situation). From its 
inception as early as 1986, COSATU and affiliated unions organised mass strike action in 
Impala Platinum mines involving 30 000 workers. The workers’ grievances were related 
to working conditions and wage differences between the ethnic groups. In September 
1989 massive stayaways, demonstrations, an overtime ban and consumer boycotts were 
launched against the Labour Relations Amendments Act, all aimed at pressurising 
employers to negotiate. Although the majority of the strikes were for the betterment of 
working conditions, the other strikes were in protest against the political systems in SA 
and in favour of democracy. The 3
rd
 August 1992 was marked by a two-day national 
stayaway in support of democracy and peace.  
 12
 
The strikes were effective in changing the policies that were nothing but detrimental to 
the SA economy. The annual growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) averaged only 
0.9 per cent over the period 1984 to 95, which, together with SA’s high population 
growth rate, resulted in a decline in real per capita GDP of almost 15 percent (Dollery, 
1997). Mohr (1994) finds that changes in the world economic growth, world trade, 
technological progress, gold production, import substitution, and foreign capital flows 
from 1975 all served to depress SA economic performance. Lowenberg (1997) examines 
the role of sanctions in changing the political stance of SA and economic suppression 
and finds that sanctions contributed to the economic crisis. The mass strike actions 
alerted the international community to the political plight of SA.   
 
Certain sectors were affected by the strike actions, indicating a decrease in growth 
during that period. Davies and van Seventer (2004) find that the trade ratio (trade ratio 
is measured as the sum of export and import values to GDP, in current prices, and is a 
commonly used crude measure of how open an economy is) only started to grow in 
1992, perhaps reflecting post-apartheid reintegration. The acceleration after 1999 
reflects domestic liberalisation policies starting to make an impact. The ratio’s average 
annual rate of growth was 5.5 per cent between 1993 and 1996, 0.8 per cent between 
1997 and 1999 and 9.8 per cent between 2000 and 2002. 
 13
 
The post-apartheid economy has been characterised by soaring unemployment, slow 
growth and an extremely low rate of investment. After 1994, government anti-poverty 
efforts aimed at improving living standards in African communities, rather than at 
helping the poor earn higher incomes through skill development (Makgetla, 2004). This 
has meant that a significant number of African employees continue to earn low wages. 
The interesting fact is that, in the recent past SA has experienced protests by various 
communities against poor service delivery in addition to company strike actions. There 
were more protests against poor service delivery in 2008 and 2009 than in other post-
apartheid years. Municipal IQ measures the performance of SA’s municipalities on a 
range of critical socio-economic and financial issues that reflect the reality of local 
government circumstances and risk on the ground. Further, Municipal IQ actively 
compares, contrasts and ranks municipalities, one against the other. In 2009, Municipal 
IQ recorded 105 service delivery protests for that year, which was a big increase from 
only 27 protests in 2008. The increase could be a reflection of voters’ dissatisfaction 
with the inability of the government to deliver on the promises made since 1994. In 
2006, only two service delivery protests were recorded and that can be attributed to the 
municipal elections and the efforts put in by local councillors to secure votes during the 
election period.  
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For example, in Standerton in Mpumalanga Province protests erupted in October 2009 
initially as a result of a lack of water and electricity and later the residents implicated all 
the local councillors in corruption within the municipality structures. The protests lasted 
for approximately a week. In Palm Ridge near Katlehong in Gauteng Province similar 
protests were reported with the same grievances, resulting in 15 people being injured 
(SABCNEWS, 2009). 
 
Companies in SA continue to experience strike actions, mostly related to wage disputes 
post apartheid. For instance, on 27 July 2005, workers at Highveld Steel and Vanadium, 
SA’s second-largest steel producer, went on a pay strike after the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa NUMSA and Solidarity trade unions rejected a revised 
wage offer of 5.5 per cent. The unions demanded 8.0 per cent and a 5.0 per cent 
increase in a housing allowance. In a bid to avert the strike, Highveld Steel increased its 
offer from 5.0 per cent to 5.5 per cent but, after the workers went ahead with the strike, 
the company reverted to 5.0 per cent. Thousands of Pick and n Pay, a franchise 
supermarket, staff stayed away on 29 August 2008. The union was demanding a R500 
increase, or 12.0 per cent, and the company was offering R350. The union further 
demanded a one-year agreement of employment instead of the multi-year agreement 
the company was offering. The union reported that its adjustments to working hours 
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and general working conditions included a minimum of 108 hours and a ‘R3 000 a 
month’ wage for staff members who work when the company needs them. 
 
Previous studies have examined the impact of industrial actions on a macroeconomic 
scale, and have revealed that they cause a decline in the country’s GDP. This may 
explain the negative GDP growth of -0.7 per cent in 2009 first quarter, the year in which 
there was the highest number of strikes in the mining industry.  
 
1.3 Research Problem 
Working days lost due to labour disputes more than doubled to 2 627 953 in 2005 
compared to 2004. The main cause of the disputes was wages, bonus and other 
compensations, which were sitting at 66.87 per cent in 2004 and 85.6 per cent in 2005 
(Industrial Actions annual reports, Department of Labour, 2005). This indicates that 
industrial action is becoming a common phenomenon in the SA working environment. 
 
The problem is that, despite government’s efforts to upgrade the standard of living for 
black people, when it comes to compensation of employees by companies, there is still 
a big gap between the wages earned by different ethnic groups. Government initiatives 
and the trade unions’ efforts to address the wage discrimination have evidently failed 
and the result has been an increase in the number of company strikes and service 
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delivery protests. While the causes of the industrial strikes are understood, the problem 
is that the impact of these strikes on share prices and on the economy at large is neither 
known nor understood. Although research has been carried out in Canada and the USA 
by Nelson et al (1994) to assess the impact of strikes on various macroeconomic factors, 
no such study to the researcher’s knowledge has been conducted in SA. 
 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
The study examines the impact of strike action on the share price in the context of 
South Africa. It uses JSE data to analyse market reaction to industrial actions. In recent 
years, SA has seen a steady increase in strike actions related to wage increases, which 
have generally been of short duration. Specifically, the objectives of this study are to 
determine: 
• The influence of industrial action on stock prices and the time taken to return to 
equilibrium; and 
• The factors that influence the occurrence of strikes. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research questions for this research are stated as follows: 
• Do stock prices deviate from the fundamentals owing to company strike actions 
in SA? 
 17
• What are economic effects/costs of strike actions in SA? 
• What underlying factors contribute to the increase in strike actions in SA in 
recent years? 
• Does the stock price fluctuation reveal the efficiency of the market? 
 
1.6 Rationale for Focusing on the Impact of Strike Actions 
Amongst the challenges that confront the SA economy in transition are: maintaining a 
structure of wages and salaries consistent with avoiding an exodus of high- and middle-
level personnel and averting frequent, production crippling social unrests such as strikes 
and riots (Green, 1991). Because industrial strikes are very common in SA, it is important 
that researchers know and understand the impact that these strikes have on the 
economy, in particular on a firm’s share prices. 
 
The results of the study should provide an insight into the extent of the impact the 
strikes have on the company stock price and more significantly on the economy. 
Company management will benefit from assessing the predictability of strikes and the 
possibility of averting them. As a result of averting strikes, there will be minimal 
downtime, which will eventually translate into earnings. Policy makers within 
government structures can examine the apparent inequality within society due to 
ineffective prioritisation of service delivery, which has seen communities protesting in 
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the streets and causing havoc in the process. Policy makers can develop and implement 
policies to address the apparent inequalities. 
 
In summary, Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, including the background of SA history and 
on strike actions, the research aim and objectives, and the research problem and 
rationale for focusing on the impact of strike actions on the stock market. The next 
chapter presents an extensive literature review of factors that influence stock market 
reaction to strikes/industrial actions and variables that have explanatory power on the 
occurrence of strikes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises relevant studies from a large body of literature related to the 
current study. Fundamental concepts have also been reviewed to illustrate their 
relevance with the current study. Section 2.2 reviews the role of unions in wage 
negotiations. Section 2.3 presents the costs and benefits of strikes in the SA context and 
Section 2.4 reviews the predictability of strikes. Section 2.5 compares the predicted 
strike outlook and the actual strike activity for the year 2010, and Section 2.6 examines 
the effect of public sector strikes on the stock market. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 report on the 
effect of firm size on strike occurrence and general factors that cause stock price 
change, respectively, and Section 2.9 focuses on stock market efficiency. Section 2.10 
reviews the concept of behavioural finance. Section 2.11 reviews the role of information 
asymmetry in the occurrence of strikes and the chapter ends with a summary of the 
findings of the literature review. 
 
2.2 Wage Negotiations and the Role of Unions 
The bargaining process requires that the two parties – the employer and the union – 
provide each other with their respective demands (known as ‘demand points’) and 
bargain in good faith. Eventually a compromise, somewhere between the demand 
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points, is reached and the negotiations are concluded. Whether this compromise 
position is attained without a labour dispute depends on many factors, some of which 
are financial (Nelson, Amoako-Adu  and Smith, 1994).  
 
There is a substantial amount of diversity in the SA bargaining system across industries 
and across firms. Wage bargaining takes place at two levels in SA. At the centralised 
level, wages are set in bargaining council agreements, which cover specific industry, 
occupation and area (either the whole country, or a province or city). At the plant level, 
bargaining occurs in both the firms covered and those not covered by bargaining council 
agreements (Azam and Rospabe, 2007).  
 
Therefore, intuitively, failure of the bargaining process at centralised level will have a 
devastating effect on company financial returns and hence the stock price. Dubin’s 
(1965) findings in predicting strike action in the US can be utilised to quantify the impact 
of strike action at a centralised level on company returns. Analysing the length and 
intensity of a strike, the possible impact of a strike on the company returns can be 
inferred. Three measures are used to measure the intensity of a strike: 1) the number of 
industrial disputes; 2) the number of workers involved; and 3) the proportion of working 
days lost due to strikes. SA strikes are generally of short duration, approximately six days 
on average as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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In 2008 65.1 per cent of the strikes had a duration of one to five days and in 2009 49.1 
per cent of the strikes lasted between six and 10 days. Only 0.5 per cent work stoppages 
lasted between 31 and 40 days. 
 
Nelson and Amoaka-Adu and Smith (1994) find that shorter duration and longer 
duration strikes have differential impacts on firms. Strikes that last a few days tend to 
reduce stock prices, whereas shareholders gain from longer duration strikes. Firms 
involved in longer strikes are probably in a better position to reject union demands and 
prolong the period of impasse, whereas management may help resolve the labour 
dispute when it is expected that the effect of the strike on the company may be too 
severe. 
Figure 2.1: Strike duration in South Africa 
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According to Neumann (1980), if the company and the unions have the same goal, 
which is to maximise the company’s wealth, then wage negotiations will be conducted 
so as to achieve a favourable outcome for both parties – then avert the strike (if we 
assume strikes are costly). 
 
In the SA context, trade unions’ main objectives are to rectify the injustices of the 
apartheid era, which include wage discrimination, rather than to seek a feasible 
resolution for both parties. Table 2.1 illustrates the main causes of strikes in SA market 
between 2003 and 2009. 
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Table 2.1: Working days lost distribution by principal cause of dispute, 2003 – 2009 (in 
percentage) 
Source: Department of Labour, Strikes Statistics,2009 
 
Table 2.1 above illustrates the changes in working days lost arranged by cause of the 
dispute. The 2003 column shows that in that year 50.8 per cent of the working days lost 
were related to wages, bonuses and other compensation. The data is on an upward 
trajectory, as noted in 2009, with 91.2 per cent of stoppages related to wages. This is in 
direct contrast to government’s objectives and reports. The strategic plan for the 
Department of Labour for 2004-2009 states the department’s objectives as (among 
others): 1) ensuring a continuing decline of workdays lost through industrial action; and 
Principal cause 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Wages, bonus and other compensation 50.8 61.7 66.5 92.7 89.9 43.7 91.2 
Working conditions 18.5 10.3 2.67 0.08 6.40 2.0 4.5 
Disciplinary matters 12.3 2.1 1.07 0.14 0.06 0.2 0.3 
Grievances 10.8 15.5 6.74 1.1 0.93 11.1 2.6 
Socio-economic and political conditions 1.4 0 20.9 5.43 0 37.6 1.0 
Secondary action 1.2 0 0.53 0.02 1.86 0.6 0.1 
Retrenchments/redundancy 1.5 4.1 1.55 0.42 0.47 0.1 0.2 
Refusal to bargain 3.1 3.1 0 0.15 0.07 1.0 0.0 
Trade union recognition 0 0 0 0 0.31 3.7 0.1 
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2) ensuring an effective and efficient dispute-resolution system (Department of Labour 
Annual Report, 2010).  
 
Johnson and Ashenfelter (1969) term the occurrence of strikes as irrational behaviour 
and it gives insight into why strikes occur or increase as is the case with SA strikes in 
recent years.  
 
An increase in strike actions also correlates with economic factors such as high inflation 
and high interest rates. This was evident in 2008 during the recession, where employees 
demanded high wage increases owing to high inflation. Trade unions also contribute to 
an increase in strike actions. A bargaining model by Johnson and Ashenfelter (1969) 
reveals that union leadership approaches wage negotiations with the following 
objectives: 
• The survival and growth of the union as an institution; and 
• The personal political survival of the leaders of the union. 
 
These objectives are accomplished, in most part, by satisfying the expectations of the 
rank and file as well as possible. For this reason unions will cause failure of wage 
negotiations to appear stringent to the firm, thereby giving them a reason for embarking 
on a strike. Under strike conditions union leadership may appear as adversaries against 
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management in a crusade which may even raise their political stock. In this way the 
abovementioned objectives of the unions are achieved and strike actions increase. 
 
 
 
2.3 Costs and Benefit of Strikes in South Africa 
The evident cost of strikes for a company is lost time in production. When South African 
Breweries (SAB) employees embarked on a strike in December 2009, 3 500 workers were 
involved and that translated into a significant decrease in output and sales. But the major 
cost of a strike is the reputation of the company. When a company embarks on a strike, it 
causes a disturbance in the supply chain and this eventually causes losses in the value of 
the company and its market share. This was evident when Nike as multinational company 
(MNC) made an investment in emerging markets in Asian countries to take advantage of 
low labour costs. When the host country’s labour regulations were not adhered to, Nike 
experienced strike actions within the company and faced a worldwide boycott of its 
products. This dented the reputation of the company and its share price. 
 
If the expected benefits from a strike exceed the costs of the strike, workers will embark 
on a strike action. The cost of the strike to workers is related to the duration of the strike. 
A strike lasting for an extended period will cause a loss of income in wages.  
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In a research study of the effects of joint strikes by Ahmed (1989), it was found that 
strikes impose a joint cost on both the employer and workers. Both the union and 
management strive to lower this joint cost by developing what Reder and Neumann 
(1980, in Ahmed, 1989) term ‘bargaining protocols’. The cost of strike can be estimated 
by using the following proxies: 1) Decline in the value of the firm as measured by the 
stock market; 2) Seller and buyer concentration indices: industries with high buyer or 
seller concentration have low joint costs of strikes because the customers will find it 
difficult to satisfy their demand and other firms will it difficult to satisfy the demand 
created by work stoppages in the industry in question; 3) Output losses: strikes may 
cause loss in output in the current, past or future period and inflict losses on both the 
parties by reducing the absolute share of the pie available to them; and 4) Intra-year 
coefficients of variation of inventory and shipments. 
 
2.4 Predictability of Strikes  
Neumann (1980) and Dubin (1965) contributed immensely to the study of predictability 
of strikes and their effect on the stock market. Their studies built on the work by Hansen 
(1921) on the effect of cyclical movements of industry on strikes. Hansen’s (1921) study 
states that when the general trend of prices (in industry) is upward we may expect to find 
labour becoming aggressive. The struggle between labour and capital becomes more 
bitter in the years of prosperity for two reasons: 1) it is in the prosperous years that 
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prices and living costs rise; and 2) the large profits accruing in years of prosperity give rise 
to a contest over their distribution.   
  
The study suggests that if the industry cycles can be determined then the industry strikes 
(company strikes) can be predicted with a high level of confidence. It is when strikes can 
be predicted that their effects can be reduced. The company earnings and stock price will 
experience fewer fluctuations as a result of wage strike actions. The strategy of 
increasing company benefits can be implemented to avert wage-related strikes. 
Increasing benefits may benefit the company as there might be tax incentives for 
allowances the company provides workers. 
 
2.5 Work Stoppage Future Outlook versus Actual, 2010 
The current study reviews the impact of strikes on the SA stock market for the period 
between 2003 and 2009. It is thus critical that the predictions for economic prospects be 
reviewed against the actual state of the economy for year 2010. This will provide an 
insight into the qualitative significance of the annual reports between 2003 and 2010 by 
the Department of Labour.  
 
Predictions by Department of Labour(2009): The economy will gradually but slowly 
recover as third-quarter figures for 2009 from Statistics South Africa reveal that real GDP 
at market prices increased by 0.9 per cent quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted and 
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annualised (Stats SA, P0441:4). Although the economy is out of recession, workers will 
continue losing their jobs as the effects of the recession will be with us for some time. 
Workers might decide to protect their jobs rather than going on strike during this difficult 
time. Inflation rates remain particularly important if the theory that work stoppages are 
caused by instabilities such as prices is true. Higher inflation correlates with increased 
work stoppage activity as workers demand higher wages when the prices of goods and 
services rise, while lower inflation correlates with decreased work stoppage activity, as 
the demand for higher wages cannot be justified on the basis of lower prices. However, 
figures from Statistics South Africa indicate that headline consumer price index (CPI) (for 
all urban areas) annual inflation rate in November 2009 was 5.8 per cent. This rate was 
0.1 per cent of a percentage point lower than the corresponding annual rate of 5.9 per 
cent in October 2009 (Stats SA, P0141:2). This is well within government’s target of 3-6 
per cent. The fact that there were a number of wage agreements concluded in 2009, e.g. 
in the clothing sector, municipal sector, construction sector and some coal, platinum and 
gold sectors and the road freight sector, might imply that the country is less likely to 
experience an upsurge in strike activity in the future. It is against this background that we 
predict less strike activity in 2010 than in 2009 (Department of Labour, 2009).  
 
Actual: The country had a significantly high percentage of public sector strikes and 
general protests related to service delivery. Company-specific strikes decreased from 
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2009 but companies involved in the World Cup 2010 experienced ‘opportunity’ strikes 
mid-year. 
 
2.6 Determinants of Public Sector Strikes 
The public sector strikes represent a decisive trial of strength for the government as it 
introduces increasing wage and employment flexibility in accordance with its neoliberal 
policies. The strike actions experienced recently involve issues of principle for unions, 
having to do with the wage gaps that are the legacies of apartheid, and the struggle for a 
‘living wage’ for workers – a wage that could meet the rising costs of basic necessities 
and services in a society that is becoming more and more commodified (Barchiesi, 1999).  
 
In their model, Nelson, Stone and Swint (2001) specify the utility function of union 
leaders and the settlement limitations placed on them by union members. Union leader 
(UL) utility function is given as: 
                                                   U (UL) = UL(X1, X2)                                              (1) 
Where X1 is the net financial gain to union members and X2 is the excess of the wage 
settlement over that level expected by union members. The greater the excess of the 
wage settlement over union members’ expectations (X2), the greater the level of power 
and prestige for the union leaders within the union organisation. This is consistent with 
the motivation of union leaders for personal power and prestige within the union as 
described in Section 2.2 in the case of the private sector. 
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The model of aggregate strike activity is tested: 
 
              S = α + β1 U + β2 w + β3G + β4E + β5T + β6L + β7P + Σ βIDi-7 + e         (2) 
Where, 
S = aggregate level of public sector strikes 
U = unemployment rate of public employees 
w = percentage change in compensation of private non-agricultural workers 
G = consolidated surplus or deficit of all state and local governments  
T = time trend 
L = dummy variable for the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 
P = consumer price index, price non-agricultural sector, all persons 
Di = seasonal dummy variable for the first three quarters 
e = error term 
E = dummy variable for the state of the economy 
 
Strikes are extremely rare where there are no union members. Dickerson and Stewart 
(1993) found that for both manual and non-manual workers in the sample period fewer 
than one in 100 establishments without union members experienced a strike. As is well 
known, union presence is much greater in the public sector, both in terms of membership 
and in terms of recognition. This makes the propensity to strike high in the public sector. 
 31
In addition, there is considerable evidence that large plants are more likely to experience 
strikes than small ones and plants are on average larger in the public sector. 
 
2.7 Firm Size and Strike Proneness 
A model by Prais suggests a new way of dealing with the old controversy of what makes 
people in large plants act differently from those in small ones. Instead of looking at 
factors such as bureaucratisation and alienation, Prais sets up a model which assumes 
that people have the same amount of ‘conflict-proneness’ or ‘disputatiousness’ whatever 
the size of the plant. If the model fits the data, it is possible to conclude that the size 
effect is due not to differences in the characteristics of people in plants of different sizes 
but to size itself. The results of a similar study the same study by Edwards (1980) indicate 
that, although the probability of a dispute can be taken to increase in proportion to the 
increase in plant size, this is counteracted by a slower growth in the number of groups 
with strike potential. Thus, strike frequency rises with plant size, but at a less-than-
proportional rate. 
 
Figure 2.2: Percentage distribution of establishments affected by labour disputes by 
employment size, 2008 and 2009 
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Figure 2.2 depicts the percentage distribution of the establishments affected by labour 
disputes by employment size in both 2008 and 2009. The disputes affected both big and 
small companies. Impala Platinum with more than 20 000 employees was also affected 
by a labour dispute in 2009, while Lake International in KwaZulu-Natal with fewer than 50 
employees in total was affected by a chemical strike. According to Figure 2.2, about 23.9 
per cent of establishments affected by labour disputes in 2009 had a total workforce of 
fewer than 50 employees compared to 9.4 per cent in 2008. Establishments with 1 000 
and more employees affected by labour disputes declined in relative terms from 41.5 per 
cent in 2008 to 13.5 per cent in 2009. 
 
2.8 Factors causing Stock Price Change 
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Stock prices have been observed to deviate from the fundamentals (accounting data) as a 
result of numerous factors. Sunde and Sanderson (2009) suggest that the determinants 
of stock prices include corporate earnings, management, lawsuits, mergers and 
takeovers, market liquidity and stability, government policy, macroeconomic 
fundamentals, investor sentiments, technical influences and analysts’ reports. 
 
Strike actions can be associated with investor sentiments as they present uncertainty and 
anxiety for risk-averse investors. A study by Chan (2003) on stock market reaction to 
news and no news reveals that stocks with bad public news display a negative drift for up 
to 12 months. This is consistent with investor overreaction to spurious price movements. 
Investors overreact to price shocks, causing excess trading volume and volatility and 
leading to reversal. 
 
 
2.8.1 Management 
Although top managers’ contribution to firm value is not directly observable, stock 
returns are a potential source of information. In an efficient market, however, stock 
return is a noisy measure of management performance. The return reflects only the 
unexpected component of top management performance and is influenced by a variety 
of exogenous factors. 
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Stock price reaction at announcement of a management change can indicate whether the 
capital market considers the event significant. Then abnormal stock return at 
announcement is the sum of two components. One is an information component that is 
negative if the change signals worse management performance than anticipated. The 
second is the real component that is positive if the changes are in shareholders’ interest. 
A positive net effect is expected only if the real component is larger in absolute value 
than the information component (Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988). The results of an 
investigation  by van Zyl (2010) of a correlation between stock prices and management 
changes indicated that management change announcements are associated with small 
but statistically significant, abnormal stock price movement, positive in some cases and 
negative in others. 
 
A study of the impact of an organisation’s chief executive officer (CEO) on its financial 
performance assumes that the CEO has influence over the company’s decisions. 
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) found that high levels of discretion given to CEOs by their 
Boards of Directors increase their ability to influence firm performance directly. Central 
to Finkelstein and Boyd’s managerial discretion concept is the idea that strategic 
leadership, especially as embodied in the role of the CEO, is pivotal to the success of the 
firm. Higher managerial discretion, and the associated increased riskiness of the CEO 
role, leads to greater potential impact of the CEO on the firm. The positive impact on firm 
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performance of a change in CEO requires that the Board of Directors has the ability to 
recognise and attract a superior successor (Denis and Denis, 1995). 
 
2.8.2 Corporate earnings 
There have been extensive studies on the influence of corporate earnings on the stock 
price. Penman (1987) used aggregate data to examine how the timing of quarterly and 
annual earnings’ announcements impacts stock returns. He found that aggregate 
corporate earnings’ reports arriving at the market during the first half-month of calendar 
quarters tend to be good news, while earnings’ reports later in the quarter tend to be 
bad news. Zarowin (1989) used individual firm data to investigate the question of stock 
market overreaction to corporate earnings’ changes and found that firm size is a more 
important factor than simply overreaction behaviour by investors. 
 
Babcock (1970) showed that earnings per share (EPS) can be decomposed into the 
product of five financial ratios:  
EPS = Tax x Margin x Turnover x Leverage x Book Value per share where 
Tax = After-tax earnings/Before-tax earnings 
Margin = Before-tax earnings/Sales 
Turnover = Sales/Total assets 
Leverage = Total assets/Shareholders’ equity 
Book value per share = Shareholders’ equity/Number of common shares 
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An increase in any one of the five financial ratios results in an increase in corporate 
earnings. Foster (1973) measures reaction of individual investor to the EPS estimates by 
computing Vi, t, weekly average of daily percentage of shares traded prior to the 
announcement and post-announcement to determine if investors perceive such an 
announcement to have any informational content. A firm’s stock prices react 
immediately to earnings’ reports, continue to drift in the same direction for three 
quarters, then partially reverse in quarter four (Kothari, Lewellen and Warner, 2006). 
 
Zarowin (1989) finds that although the poorest earnings’ performers outperform the best 
earnings’ performers by a statistically significant percentage over the event window, 
subsequent to the extreme earnings’ year, the result is due primarily to differences in 
size between the two groups. Poor earners tend to be smaller firms than good earners. 
When poor earners are matched with good earners of equal size, there is little difference 
in return behaviour. When poor (or good) earners of disparate sizes are compared, small 
firms outperform large firms, and smaller winners outperform larger losers. 
 
2.8.3 Analysts’ reports 
The analysts’ new buy stock recommendations compared with new sells are associated 
with: i) overoptimism bias (as measured by the optimistic tone of language used in their 
research reports compared with subsequent lack of stock outperformance); ii) 
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representativeness bias (as measured by previous stock price performance, growth status 
of the firm (low book-to-market) and firm size); and iii) corporate relationships between 
their investment bank employers and the firms they are following (Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, 
Taffler and Agarwal, 2009). The event study reveals that in the case of new buys, market 
reaction is complete by the end of the month in which the recommendation is issued, 
while, in contrast, the market continues to react for up to a year to new sell 
recommendations. 
 
In making recommendations, one source of potential bias could be the practice of 
analysts to recommend stocks after an abnormal price decline, so that the abnormal 
returns during the recommendation period are biased upwards (Bjerring, Lakpnishok and 
Vermaelen, 1983). 
 
Analysts are generally required to rank firms using their brokerage’s particular equity 
ranking system (e.g. buy/hold/sell). Typically, the number of categories available to an 
analyst is limited to only a few. Most brokerages restrict analysts to issue 
recommendation, using one of a small number of equity-ranking categories. While the 
contents of an analyst’s full report contain significantly more detail than simply this 
recommendation, it is the analyst’s categorical recommendation that is widely reported 
in the media (Morgan and Stocken, 2003). Therefore, the stock price will adjust to 
conform to the analyst’s expectations. 
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Bhana (1990) performed an evaluation of the effectiveness of share recommendations by 
two large firms of stockbrokers in the SA environment. The result of the study suggested 
that the evident ability of stockbrokers to provide better investment recommendations 
stems from their superior access to new information that is processed more quickly and 
efficiently than most investors. Prayag and van Rensburg (2006) found that an investor 
generally earns significantly higher returns by acting on downgrades instead of strictly 
following the level of SA stock broking firms’ analysts’ consensus buy, hold and sell 
recommendations. 
 
2.8.4 Government  
A study by Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2007) investigated the relationship 
between politics and stock markets by focusing both on the entire term of office and on 
the day on which voters cast their ballots. The conclusion from the analysis reveals that 
investors do not re-adjust their discount rates in response to election results. 
 
Governments shape the environment in which the private sector operates. They affect 
firms in many ways: by imposing taxes, providing subsidies, enforcing laws, regulating 
competition, and defining environmental policies. Pastor and Veronesi’s (2010) analysis 
of uncertainty about government policy categorises uncertainty as policy uncertainty and 
political uncertainty. The results of the study show that, on average, stock prices fall at 
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the announcement of a policy change. Given the government’s economic motive, any 
policy change that lifts stock prices is mostly expected, so that much of its effect is priced 
in before the announcement. In contrast, negative announcement returns tend to be 
larger because they occur when the announcement of a policy change contains a bigger 
element of surprise. 
 
The presence of political risk is a worldwide phenomenon that affected most national 
bond and stock markets in the 20
th
 century. Beaulieu and Cosset et al (2005), when 
examining the impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns in Canada, found 
that unfavourable political news has a more significant impact on the volatility of stock 
returns than favourable political news. However, the exposure to political risk varies with 
two characteristics of firms: 1) nature of their assets and 2) the level of their international 
activities. 
 
The impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns is based on the premise that 
the value of a firm is equal to the present value of its expected cash flows, whereas the 
discount rate represents investors’ required rate of return (Beaulieu, Cosset and 
Essaddam, 2005).   
 
 
 
 40
2.9 Stock Market Efficiency  
Market efficiency in economic literature has been equated with market outcomes by 
perfect competition. Under perfectly competitive conditions, the interplay of sellers and 
buyers leads to the establishment of a unique market price in which the marginal cost of 
supply is equal to the marginal satisfaction obtained by buyers; supply costs are 
everywhere minimised; and no market participant can gain without loss to another 
(Collins, 1966). 
 
A capital market is said to be efficient with respect to an information item if the prices of 
securities fully impound the returns’ implications of that item. In an efficient market, 
when a new information item is added to the market, its revaluation implications for 
security returns are instantaneously and unbiasedly impounded in the current market 
price. Several studies have empirically tested the reaction of security prices to the release 
of different information (Raja and Sudhahar, 2010).   
 
Another measure of efficiency is the capitalisation ratio. Jefferis and Smith (2005) listed 
the capitalisation ratios of different African stock markets to highlight the changes in 
their efficiency. SA’s stock market was found to be weak-form efficient during the 
evaluation period. This implies that the prices fully reflect the information implicit in the 
sequence of past prices. The other forms of market efficiency include semi-strong and 
efficient. 
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However, Thaler (1999) finds that there are five areas in which behaviour in the real 
world seems most at odds with the theories:  
a) Volume  
The standard model of asset markets predicts that participants will trade very 
little. Of course, pinning down exactly how little volume should be expected in 
this world is difficult because in the real world people have liquidity and 
rebalancing needs, but it seems safe to say that 700 million shares a day on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is far more trading than the standard market 
model would expect. 
 
b) Volatility 
In a rational world, prices change only when news arrives. Shiller’s (1981) 
conclusion states that stock and bond prices are more volatile than advocates of 
rational efficient market theory would predict. 
 
c) Dividends 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that in an efficient market with no taxes, 
dividend policy is irrelevant. Therefore, the reaction of stock prices, specifically a 
rise in stock price when dividends are initiated or increased, can be attributed to 
irrationality. 
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d) Equity Premium Puzzle 
One would expect returns on equities to be higher because they are riskier than 
T-bills, but a return differential of 7 per cent a year is too much to be explained by 
risk alone. 
 
e) Predictability 
In an efficient market, future returns cannot be predicted on the basis of existing 
information. In recent history, it has been accepted that stock prices are at least 
partly predictable (example by Fama, 1991) on the basis of past returns: such 
measures of value as price-to-earnings or price-to-book ratios, company 
announcements of earnings, dividend changes, and share repurchases and 
seasoned equity offerings. Although considerable controversy remains about 
whether the observed predictability is best explained by mispricing or risk, no one 
can has been able to specify an observable risk measure that can explain the 
existing data pattern. 
 
2.10 Behavioural Finance 
Behavioural finance does not try to define ‘rational’ behaviour or label decision making 
as biased or faulty; it seeks to understand and predict systematic financial market 
implications of psychological decision processes. 
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In financial markets, analysts and investors generate information for trading through 
means such as interviewing management, verifying rumours and analysing financial 
statements. If an investor overestimates his ability to generate information, or to identify 
the significance of existing data that others neglect, he will underestimate his forecast 
errors. If he is more overconfident about signals or assessments with which he has 
greater personal involvement, he will tend to be overconfident about the information he 
has generated (Daniel, Hirshliefer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). Their study reveals that 
overconfident-informed overweights the private signal relative to the prior, causing the 
stock price to overreact. 
 
Bernard and Thomas (1990) suggest that investors ignore autocorrelation patterns in 
quarterly earnings’ reports and are thus surprised by predictable changes in earnings. 
The price response to earning announcements aligns closely with this prediction (Kothari, 
Lewellen and Warner, 2006). 
 
Conservatism, as documented by Edward (1968), states that individuals are slow to 
change their beliefs in the face of new evidence. In his experiments he found that 
individuals update their posteriors in the right direction, but by too little in magnitude 
relative to the rational Bayesian benchmark. Conservatism is extremely suggestive of the 
underreaction evidence already discussed. 
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A second important phenomenon documented by psychologists is the representativeness 
heuristic. The important manifestation of the representativeness heuristic is that people 
think they see patterns in truly random sequences. This aspect of the representative 
heuristic is suggestive of the overreaction evidence already discussed (Barberis, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1998). 
 
In addition, empirical evidence suggests that decision behaviours contribute to the 
following investment-related characteristics: 1) Excessive stock-price volatility and 
bubbles in prices; 2) Follow-the-leader or herding behaviour among investors; 3) Asset 
prices appearing to over- or under-react to new market information; 4) Popular 
investments earning poorer-than-desired returns; and 5) individual investors holding 
poorly diversified portfolios (Olsen, 1998). 
 
The reaction of stock prices to the announcements of strikes is found to have a negative 
effect on the returns. Although the strike does temporarily affect production output, in 
theory, the strike should not be able to affect the stock price since, as noted earlier, SA 
strikes are usually of short duration, lasting between one and five days. The negative 
reaction can only be attributed to investor sentiments and the factor of uncertainty.  
 
2.11 Information Asymmetry 
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Information asymmetry is an economic model that examines what happens when one 
party in a transaction knows more than another. The concept of asymmetric information 
was first introduced in Akerlof’s 1970 paper. His basic argument is that in many markets 
the buyer uses some market statistic to measure the value of a class of goods. Thus, the 
buyer sees the average of the whole market while the seller has more intimate 
knowledge of a specific item. Akerlof argues that this information asymmetry gives the 
seller an incentive to sell goods of less-than-the-average market quality. The process 
results in adverse selection.  
 
This theory has been applied in different industries. Qian and Zhong (2009) examine a 
firm’s R&D investments prior to equity issuance. When companies go to the public 
market to raise money, their managers are likely to have better information about the 
investment opportunities than potential outside investors. Because of the information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors, ‘good’ issuers may have to signal their 
information to the market so as to distinguish themselves from bad issuers. 
 
Samuelson (1984) examines the optimal bargaining behaviour for the informed and 
uninformed agents. The conclusions from Samuelson’s (1984) study reveal that an 
uninformed buyer achieves his maximal attainable expected profit when he has the 
opportunity to make a first-and-final offer which the seller can accept or reject. More 
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significantly, the study shows that for an economic exchange to be possible, a necessary 
and sufficient condition is that the buyer can make a profitable first-and-final offer.  
 
The concept of asymmetric information can also be applied in the current study. In 
labour negotiations, especially wage negotiations, both parties have to have access to the 
same information to prevent adverse selection and a strike. 
 
The role of unions in wage negotiations in SA has been examined in previous studies. 
There are models that have been developed that link strike action to faulty information. 
Firstly, workers may systematically misestimate the future state of the economy. For 
example, it has been argued that workers’ expectations of inflation are adaptive, while 
firms’ expectations are rational. Thus, in the short run, unions will lag behind in adjusting 
their expectations to the actual rate of inflation (Kaufman, 1981). Secondly, a firm may 
have access to private information not available to the union. In this formulation, the 
strike serves as an information-gathering mechanism that allows the union to infer the 
firm’s private information, based on management’s actions. Thirdly, as argued by 
Cousineau and Lacroix (1986), union and management uncertainty over each other’s 
bargaining power raises the difficulty in reaching an agreement and thus contributes to 
strikes (Gramm, Hendricks and Kahn, 1988). 
 
2.12 Summary 
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Strikes have a devastating impact on the company stock price. There are numerous 
factors that have been cited as affecting the stock price, including change in government 
policies, announcement of bad or good news pertaining to a company’s financial status, 
strike/industrial disputes, and so forth.  
 
The current study reviews the determinants of strikes in the case of SA. The determinants 
that have been outlined are: 1) the trade union’s objective when conducting wage 
negotiations differs from the objective of the company; 2) the economic climate plays a 
role in the occurrence of strikes; and 3) information asymmetry that exists between the 
trade union and company management is a catalyst in the process. Understanding these 
factors enables the prediction of strikes and therefore minimises the impact on the 
company production and the stock price. 
 
The SA stock market has been identified as falling between weak-form and semi-strong, 
which determines how soon the news of a looming strike is incorporated into the stock 
price. Weak-form efficiency states that stock prices instantly and fully reflect all 
information of the past prices. This means that future price movements cannot be 
predicted by using past prices. Semi-strong market efficiency states that asset prices fully 
reflect all of the public and inside information available. Therefore, no one can have an 
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advantage on the market in predicting prices since there is no data that would provide 
any additional value to the investors.  
This suggests that stock prices will adjust to the news of a looming strike and therefore 
the event window should be between a few days prior to the strike and a few days after 
the strike as elaborated on in Chapter 3. 
The concept of behavioural finance was also introduced in this chapter to help explain 
the irrational behaviour of some investors. Investor sentiments play a vital role in stock 
price movements. The announcement of a strike can be classified as bad news and it 
leads to a decrease in stock price, as discussed in this literature review. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used to conduct the study. It also presents the 
sample and the sample-selection criteria. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research approach and methodology employed to achieve the 
research objectives and answer the research questions posed by this study. Section 3.2 
describes the data and its sources and how the sample was selected. Section 3.3 
discusses the event study methodology used to assess the impact of strikes on share 
prices. Section 3.4 discusses the regression model used to assess the predictability of 
strikes. The chapter ends with a summary of its main points. 
 
3.2 Data, Data Source and Sample Selection 
The data used to carry out this analysis is financial data for companies listed on the JSE 
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange), more specifically the stock price of companies that had 
experienced industrial actions. The source of such data is McGregor BFA because the 
data is updated frequently and is more reliable. The research period for the study is from 
2003 to 2009. This period is presumed to be long enough to ascertain that the empirical 
results are valid and accurate. The industrial actions that occurred during the research 
period are obtained from the Department of Labour. The data needed for the regression 
model included company performance and economic indicators: repo rate and this data 
are obtained from McGregor BFA. The company codes used by the financial database 
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McGregor BFA are used to reference companies in the sample, as indicated in Appendix A 
to this report. 
 
The Department of Labour defines a strike action as : The partial or complete concerted 
refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have 
been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of 
remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest 
between employer and worker, and every reference to work in this definition includes 
overtime work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory (Industrial Action Annual Report, 
2009,pp 48).  
 
The sample for the study is selected using the following criterion: all companies that 
experienced industrial action/strikes between 2003 and 2009. The sample is reduced 
further, using the criteria listed in Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1: Sample-selection criteria 
SAMPLE-SELECTION CRITERIA No. 
Companies experiencing industrial action/strike between 2003 and 2009 
Exclude unlisted companies 
 Exclude companies with incomplete information, for example 
 earnings’ report, strike date and so forth 
495 
414 
32 
Total sample 49 
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Table 3.1 above illustrates the sample-selection process. All unlisted companies were 
excluded from the sample because they do not have share price data. Additionally, 
companies that had not disclosed their financial results, published the date of strike 
action and so forth were discarded from the study because it was expected to be difficult 
to quantify the impact of the strike on the stock price of those companies. 
 
3.3 Research Design and Event Study Methodology 
The aim of this research is to assess the impact of firm strike/industrial action on the 
stock price and to measure the extent to which the industrial actions can be predicted 
using the regression model. Nelson, Amoako-Adu and Smith (1994) found that company 
stock price in Canada experienced a decline of 2.1 per cent 50 days prior to the strike 
day. Their study also revealed that shorter duration strikes experienced a decrease in 
stock value of 6.2 per cent while longer strikes experienced a decrease of only 2.8 per 
cent. Becker and Olson (1986) found that the NYSE-listed companies experienced a 4.1 
per cent decrease in shareholder equity 30 days preceding the strike action involving an 
average of 1 000 workers.  
 
The impact of all the industrial actions SA has experienced in the recent past has not 
been quantified. This research aims to assess the impact of the strikes on the stock 
prices, as conducted in Canada, USA, Netherlands and so forth. 
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3.3.1 Event study methodology 
Event studies, introduced by Fama et al (1969), produce useful evidence on how stock 
prices respond to information. Many studies focus on returns in a short window (a few 
days) around a cleanly dated event. An advantage of this approach is that because daily 
expected returns are close to zero, the model for expected returns does not have a big 
effect on inferences about abnormal returns.  
 
The assumption in studies that focus on short-return windows is that any lag in the 
response of prices to an event is short lived. There is a developing literature that 
challenges this assumption, arguing that stock prices adjust slowly to information, so one 
must examine returns over long horizons to get a full view of market inefficiency (Fama, 
1998). 
 
There are essentially four types of event studies: 1) information content (Ball and 
Brown); 2) market efficiency (FFJR – Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll); 3) model evaluation; 
and 4) metric explanation. Bowman (1983) further presents the structure of event study 
as being made up of five steps: identify the event of interest; model the security price 
reaction; estimate excess returns; organise and group excess returns; and analyse the 
results. 
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This study utilised the abovementioned steps to answer the research questions. 
 
3.3.1.1 Calculating returns  
To estimate the distribution of abnormal returns over time, cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) have to be estimated. CARs are aggregated average abnormal returns calculated 
over the event window. For the market model residual returns, it is assumed that the 
nominal stock returns are generated by the following process:  
Rit = α + ßiRmt + eit                                              (3) 
 
Rit is the natural logarithm of the return for firm i in week t, and Rmt  is the natural 
logarithm of the return on the relevant market index; α and ß are the parameters to be 
estimated for the 60-week period. The benefit of using the market model is dependent 
on the R
2
 of the market model regression. The higher the R
2
 the greater is the variance 
reduction of the abnormal return and the larger is the gain (Raja and Sudhahar, 2010).  
 
The daily returns are calculated for both individual securities as well as the industry 
index, using the following equation:  
 
                                      Rit = 
1
1
−
−
−
t
tt
P
PP
 x 100                                                             (4) 
Where  
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Rit – reruns on security i on time t 
Pt – price of security at time t 
Pt-1 – price of the security at time t-1 
 
Abnormal Returns (ARs) under market-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated by 
using the equation as below: 
         ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t                                                                  (5) 
Where, 
ARi,t = Abnormal returns on security i at time t  
Ri,t = Actual returns on security i at time t  
Rm,t = Actual returns on industry index 
 
Cumulative returns are computed using the following formula: 
 
                                  CAR = Σ ARi,t                                                     (6) 
 
For the purpose of this study, the above model is modified to use the industry index (not 
market index – ALL SHARE INDEX) to calculate abnormal returns.  
 
Existing literature suggests that examining the response of stock prices over a period of 
less than a month does not accurately measure the return to an investor who holds a 
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security for a long post-event period. These studies recommend using the BHAR (buy and 
hold abnormal returns) model. For this study, the following reasons by Fama (1998) led 
to the choice of the CAR over the BHAR model: one, asset pricing models commonly 
assume normally distributed returns. Normality is a better approximation for shorter 
horizons like a month than for longer horizons, where skewness becomes increasingly 
important. Two, the empirical tests of asset pricing models, invoked to justify applying 
the models in tests of market efficiency, typically use monthly returns. Three, BHAR can 
give false impressions of the speed of price adjustment to an event. The reason is that 
BHARs can grow with the return horizon even when there is no abnormal return after the 
first period. 
 
Industrial actions in SA are of short duration, lasting between one and five days; 
therefore, the BHAR model was not deemed appropriate as it measures the abnormal 
returns over a longer horizon. 
 
On the basis of the literature review, it is expected that the results of the study would 
reveal that company-specific strikes have a negative effect on the stock market in SA. 
Therefore, the critical findings of this study will be to determine the efficiency of the 
stock market. This will be observed by the auto-correction factor of the market. 
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Using a sample of listed companies on the JSE, the  CAR model is tested using the event 
study methodology to exploit information on companies (within the same industry) that 
do not experience strike action and the industry index. 
 
3.3.1.2 t-statistic  
To judge the statistical significance of the ARs, the Dodd and Warner (1983) methodology 
is then used to compute standardised ARs and their test statistics. To test the null 
hypothesis that the mean BHAR is equal to zero for a sample of n firms, the conventional 
t-statistic is utilised: 
  
                                  t = 
nAR
ARmean
/)( τσ
                                             (7) 
where  
ARmean – sample mean 
σ(ARΤ) – cross-sectional sample standard deviation of abnormal returns for the sample of 
n firms.  
(Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999) 
 
3.3.2 Benchmark formation  
Fama and French (1992) illustrate that the size (ME) and book-to-market equity of 
average stock (BE/ME) provide a simple and powerful characterisation of the cross-
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section of average stock returns for the 1963 to 1990 period in the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stock exchanges. In a later study (1995) they also present evidence that small 
stocks have much lower profitability than large stocks. For this reason in formulating the 
benchmark for determining CAR pre/post the strike action, a portfolio is constructed, 
based on size and industry. The justification for inclusion of industry is: company returns 
are affected by industry policies and the economic climate. 
 
Owing to the sample-selection criteria stated in the previous section, six value-weighted 
portfolios are formed by sorting the sample by industry classification first, and 
subsequently sorting the data by company size. Company size is measured by market 
capitalisation (market capitalisation = stock price x number of shares outstanding). The 
average number of companies in a portfolio is was two, with the exception of the Mining 
Industry Portfolio and General Retailers.      
 
3.3.3 Problems with heteroskedasticity and dependence 
There are several potential problems in hypothesis testing, owing to the fact that 
frequently the AR estimators are not independent or they do not have identical variance. 
For instance, often the AR estimators: 1) are cross-sectionally (in event time) correlated; 
2) have different variances across firms; 3) are not independent across time for a given 
firm; or 4) have greater variance during the event period than in the surrounding periods 
(Binder, 1998). 
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Cross-sectional dependence is not a problem when the event periods are randomly 
dispersed through calendar time; i.e., the event dates are not, in the terminology of 
Brown and Warner (1980), ‘clustered’. The study used this approach to avoid 
interdependence. 
 
3.4 Propensity to Strike: Probabilistic Model 
The second part of the study aimed at building a regression model that can predict 
whether a firm will encounter industrial action. Factors identified in the literature review 
are tested for correlation, using the following model:  
Ystrike occurrence = α + β1XFIRM_SIZE + β2XFIRM_PERFORM + β3XECONOMIC _IND+ β4XUNION_PRES ε0         (8) 
Where: 
β1 – FIRM_SIZE 
β2 – FIRM_PERFORM 
β3 – ECONOMIC_IND (repo) 
β4 – UNION_PRES 
 
The independent variable was identified as the occurrence of a strike and the 
explanatory variables as trade union presence, size in a firm, company performance, 
information asymmetry and the other factors such as economic climate causing the 
occurrence of strikes.  
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Firm size is hypothesised as a predictor because the bigger the size of the company the 
greater the probability of unionisation. This hypothesis was validated by the statistics 
obtained from the Department of Labour, which indicated that a large percentage of 
work stoppages occur in companies with workforces of greater than 1 000. This variable 
is FIRM_SIZE in the model and is measured by market capitalisation, with data obtained 
from McGregor BFA. The Department of Labour defines firm size by employment size, 
but for regression analysis market capitalisation is used to indicate firm size. 
 
Company performance is hypothesised as a predictor because the struggle between 
labour and capital becomes increasingly bitter in the years of prosperity for two reasons: 
1) it is in the prosperous years that prices and living costs rise, and 2) the large profits 
accruing in years of prosperity give rise to a contest over their distribution, as discussed 
by Neumann (1980) and Dubin (1965). This variable is FIRMS_PERFORM in the model and 
is measured by profit margin in percentage, with the data obtained from McGregor BFA. 
 
Economic indicator (specifically the REPO rate) is hypothesised as a predictor because, 
for strikes to be effective as a show of force, the union needs to win a substantial 
demand. Unions are most likely to win substantial demands in periods of economic 
upturn, when the demand for a firm’s products is high and the firm will quickly settle to 
avoid losing valuable orders and market share. Thus, in times of economic upturn, unions 
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can maximise their share of the value added and reap the reputational or membership 
benefits of successful strikes by going on short strikes. Furthermore, one would expect 
unions to engage in short strikes in economic upturns even if the firm agrees to the wage 
demand prior to the strike because the membership gain associated with a show of force 
exceeds the loss of revenues from a brief strike. In times of economic downturn, the 
demand for the firm’s products will be low and the firm will have less incentive to settle. 
Because strikes will take longer to win in an economic downturn, they become more 
expensive for unions, and consequently unions will engage in fewer short, ‘frivolous’ 
strikes for a show of force. Instead, strikes in an economic downturn are likely to be 
defensive in nature and protracted and are more likely to be over wage cuts than wage 
hikes, as presented by Teitelbaum (2007). This variable is ECONOMIC_IND in the model 
and it is measured by the REPO rate. The REPO data is obtained from the South African 
Reserve Bank’s website (http://www.reservebank.co.za/). 
 
Union presence is hypothesised as a predictor because a high unionisation rate implies 
that the union would have stronger bargaining power than the firm in wage negotiations. 
Failure of wage negotiations would affect the firm in terms of loss of production or 
downtime. 
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Data on unionisation rate/union presence for individual firms is not readily available and 
could not be obtained within the prescribed timeframe. This meant that the union 
presence variable had to be excluded from the model. 
 
3.5 Summary 
Using the event study methodology outlined by Bowman (1983), ARs were computed to 
determine the overall effect of strikes on the stock market, the JSE. Additionally, a 
probabilistic model was tested to ascertain whether firm size, firm performance and the 
economic indicator REPO rate have explanatory power on the occurrence of strikes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data used in the analysis and subsequently shows the 
performance of the firms that experienced a strike 14 days before the strike and 14 days 
after the strike. Section 4.2 describes the data used for the research study. Section 4.3 
presents the results of CAR calculation prior to and post the strike. Section 4.4 presents 
the firm performance during the strike period. Section 4.5 presents the output of the 
regression model: predictive model. 
 
4.2 Data Description  
Table 4.1 describes the data used in this research. The table illustrates that strike 
incidents have decreased from 2005 but that is not aligned with the number of days of 
work stoppages in the same period. The cause of the increase in work stoppages is an 
increase in multi-employer strikes as opposed to single company only. The average size 
of the firm involved in a majority of industrial disputes between 2003 and 2009 is 580.  
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Table 4.1: Data description 
Year No. of strikes Average size Industry 
Unionisation 
rate 
Average number of 
employees 
2003 63 350 Manufacturing - 83 533 
2004 49 400 Manufacturing - 395 301 
2005 105 350 
Community 
services - 399 291 
2006 99 560 
Community 
services 23.8 250 787 
2007 75 600 
Community 
services 24.2 608 919 
2008 57 1 100 
Community 
services 24.2 118 979 
2009 51 700 Transport 25.1 169922 
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The average number of workers involved in strike actions peaked in 2007 at 608 919, 
which can be associated with the pre-recessionary period; in 2008 the number of 
workers on strike decreased as the country went into a recessionary phase. The average 
number of strikes experienced over the eight years is 71, with the highest number of 
strikes happening in 2005. 
 
The industry that has consistently been affected by numerous strikes over time is 
community services. The industry dispute is related to the inability of government to 
deliver services and sufficiently compensate public sector workers. 
 
It is noted that an increase in unionisation rate will continue to be the major cause of 
strikes in SA, as mentioned under the literature review above. In the SA context, trade 
unions’ main objectives are to rectify the injustices of the apartheid era, which include 
wage discrimination, rather than to seek a feasible resolution for both parties.  
 
4.3 Share Performance 
This section analyses share performance of the 49 firms that made up the study sample 
14 days before the strike and 14 days after the strike. The expected return is calculated 
by using equation (4) and ARs are computed using equation (5). CARs use equation (6). 
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Table 4.2: Performance measure using CAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAY 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) 
t-stat 
-14 0.0034 1.5723 
-13 0.0045 4.4610 
-12 0.0068 1.6601 
-11 -0.0082 -0.0002 
-10 -0.0147 -3.6321 
-9 -0.0174 1.2891 
-8 -0.0194 1.1032 
-7 -0.0222 -2.6321 
-6 -0.0191 2.8711 
-5 -0.0213 -1.1878 
-4 -0.0191 1.0324 
-3 0.0035 0.0004 
-2 -0.0089 -7.2490 
-1 -0.0177 -5.3001 
0 -0.0169 8.0567 
1 -0.0409 0.0005 
2 -0.0559 0.0001 
3 -0.0468 4.7755 
4 -0.0500 7.3732 
5 -0.0494 2.5200 
6 -0.0599 -7.2231 
7 -0.0529 2.3891 
8 -0.0564 -2.9053 
9 -0.0582 -7.4126 
10 -0.0637 -3.1404 
11 -0.0670 -1.6733 
12 -0.0663 2.6779 
13 -0.0721 -3.7004 
14 -0.0646 4.8223 
 66
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the CARs for the sample used in the study. The CARs are 
significantly negative within the event window. Pre-event CAR changes from 0.0068 in 
day 12 to -0.0082 in day 11. It can be inferred that the market merely reacts to the news 
for the ‘looming strike’ prior commencement. Post the strike, the stock price continues to 
decrease in value until the end of the event window. In day 14, there is evidence of the 
stock price recovering from the strike action. Market reaction is graphically represented 
in Figure 4.1. t-stat (4.8223) analysis indicates that the probability that the ARs 
experienced by the firm occurred by chance is small and is statistically significant and can 
be accepted for the analysis. 
 
Figure 4.1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
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4.4 Additional Analysis 
In this additional analysis, six portfolios were formed. Two out of the six portfolios that 
were created could be used to measure the CARs for the industry, arranged by size, 
because the five other portfolios could not be used because of size. The portfolios are 
listed in Table 4.3. Two portfolios, the mining industry portfolio and general retailers, 
could be used in the computation of CARs for the study. Analysing industry portfolios 
depicts the actual reaction of the industry to a strike and provides a platform from which 
to infer the efficiency of the stock market. 
 
Table 4.3: Types of portfolios 
PORTFOLIO NO. OF COMPANIES 
Mining  30 
General Retailers 13 
Beverages 1 
Food Producers 2 
Telecommunication  2 
Oil and Gas Producers 1 
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Figure 4.2: CARs for the mining industry 
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Figure 4.2 indicates that average returns for mining industry stock decrease in value 11 
days prior to the strike but rebound three days prior to the strike. The downward 
trajectory is evident after the strike up to the end of the event window. 
 
The mining industry portfolio is bigger in size than the other portfolio; therefore, overall 
CARs for the sample in Figure 4.1 are substantially influenced by the trajectory of the 
mining industry portfolio. 
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Figure 4.3: CARs for general retailers 
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Figure 4.3 illustrates the reaction of the stock market to a strike in the general retailers 
industry. Stock returns decrease 12 days prior to the strike and continue to decrease to 
the end of the event window. Therefore, the stock price takes longer than 14 days to 
return to equilibrium and inference can be made regarding the efficiency of the SA stock 
market, the JSE. 
 
Table 4.4 summarises the results for the CARs and the corresponding tests for statistical 
significance. The t-stat values reveal that the results are statistically significant.  
 
 70
 
Table 4.4: Industry portfolio result summary  
DAY 
Mining 
Industry 
Portfolio CAR 
Mining Industry 
Portfolio t-stat 
General 
Retailers 
Portfolio CAR 
General Retailers 
t-stat 
-14 0.0116 1.4887 0.0026 -0.1046 
-13 0.0089 -0.4129 0.0056 0.8552 
-12 0.0050 -0.3012 -0.0046 1.4891 
-11 -0.0250 1.0516 -0.0055 6.7981 
-10 -0.0293 1.2008 -0.0014 0.1010 
-9 -0.0348 0.6556 -0.0087 0.9597 
-8 -0.0370 0.2088 -0.0020 0.0702 
-7 -0.0457 0.5928 -0.0085 0.8284 
-6 -0.0260 1.0379 -0.0133 0.6102 
-5 -0.0211 0.5346 -0.0246 0.1069 
-4 -0.0137 0.7189 -0.0281 0.0570 
-3 0.0360 1.1999 -0.0288 0.0876 
-2 0.0108 2.1944 -0.0305 0.4691 
-1 -0.0050 1.4885 -0.0246 0.0602 
0 -0.0023 0.1301 -0.0382 2.6573 
1 -0.0527 1.0744 -0.0357 0.8449 
2 -0.0855 1.5298 -0.0308 0.9987 
3 -0.0625 2.2379 -0.0362 1.3297 
4 -0.0707 2.2406 -0.0366 0.1616 
5 -0.0741 0.3678 -0.0298 0.1995 
6 -0.1006 2.0288 -0.0341 0.8174 
7 -0.0878 2.4364 -0.0306 0.4218 
8 -0.0964 1.2411 -0.0109 3.4748 
9 -0.1036 0.8065 -0.0068 0.5867 
10 -0.1184 2.1526 -0.0145 0.5048 
11 -0.1280 0.1103 -0.0148 0.0679 
12 -0.1273 0.0962 -0.0145 0.0839 
13 -0.1365 0.6453 -0.0177 0.5032 
14 -0.1230 0.9709 -0.0221 -0.7852 
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4.5 Firm Performance 
Table 4.5 shows the empirical result of the reaction of the market to strike actions for the 
specified sample of companies. Average ARs pre-event are -0.0012 and post-event 
returns are -0.0022. The average ARs prior to the event are higher than the average 
returns post the event. This is indicative of investors reacting to the strike news post the 
event. The investors only adjust their expectations after the announcement of the strike. 
 
Table 4.5: Analysis of ARs 
Day Average Abnormal Returns 
-1 to -14 -0.00127 
0 0.00083 
1 to 14 -0.00313 
-14 to 14 -0.00223 
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Figure 4.4: Average ARs 
 
 
Figure 4.4 indicates that the market reacts to the announcement of a looming strike 
action and adjusts the expectations, which causes a decrease in the average ARs in 
day - 2 (pre-event). The average ARs between day - 14 and day - 1 are computed to be 
-0.00127. The market reaches equilibrium between day 5 and day 7 (post-event) at 
-0.00313.   
 
As per the finding of Kramer and Vasconcellos (1996), there is evidence of a share price 
rebound after the settlement of the strike that was sufficiently strong to balance the 
negative share price effect associated with the beginning of the strike. This does not 
support the asymmetric information hypothesis that strikes are primarily a means by 
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which firms reveal profit information held only by the management. Instead, it suggests 
that the negative stock price response to a strike is felt only during the strike period and 
that the negative effect is largely erased by a positive price reaction to the end of the 
strike. Therefore, the stock price adjusted to reflect the costs of being on strike rather 
than the need for a permanent reevaluation of the firm as suggested by the asymmetric 
information hypothesis (Kramer and Hyclak, 2002).  
 
The model in equation (3) was tested using regression analysis and the results are 
presented in Appendix C. The regression of expected average company returns, Ri for the 
sample with expected market returns, Rm shows that the P-value is statistically 
significant at 0.003454 at 95% confidence level, t-stat, 3.20525026. A generally reliable 
method specifies that a t-stat of greater than +2 is acceptable and states that the higher 
the t-stat, the greater the confidence in the coefficient being the predictor. Therefore the 
t-stat for the sample is statically significant. 
 
4.6 Probabilistic Model 
The probabilistic model regression output shown in Appendix D indicates that the factors 
outlined are not statistically significant in explaining the occurrence of strike action. The 
results are in contrast with the literature review findings. Numerous factors could be 
identified as attributing to the discrepancy.  
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The ideal model in equation (9) only tested three variables: company performance, firm 
size and economic indicator. Therefore, the other variable, trade union presence in a 
company, is not included in the model and might have manifested in the three variables 
that were tested.  
 
The p-value for company performance, firm size and economic indicator is 0.644933, 
0.260886 and 0.97899 respectively at 95% confidence level. The p-value indicates that 
the company performance, firm size and repo rate are statistically insignificant. This 
implies that these factors do not have explanatory powers for the probability of 
occurrence of company strikes. 
 
4.6.1 Univariate tests 
The univariate test results for the model are presented in Table 4.6. The regression 
analysis suggests that performance and size have no explanatory power regarding the 
probability of occurrence of a company strike. However, the p-value of 0.057808 for 
economic indicator implies that the economic climate influences the probability of 
occurrence of company strikes. This suggests that other factors need to be investigated 
to determine their influence on the predictability of the strike. Factors such as trade 
union membership, management, firm size relative to the industry, and employee 
turnover can be tested using the probabilistic model. 
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There are numerous factors that have an influence on these values and these factors are 
discussed at length in the following chapter  section.  
 
Table 4.6: Univariate regression  
 
Detailed univariate regression analysis is presented in Appendix E. 
 
4.7 Summary  
The chapter presents the computation of CAR for the selected sample. CAR indicates that 
the stock price decreases prior to the strike and experiences a significant decrease at day 
-5; the trend is prevalent post the strike action. Stock price stabilises outside the event 
window.  
 
The data gives insight into the efficiency of the SA stock market, the JSE. Information 
pertaining to the strike is not immediately incorporated into the valuation of the stock. 
 
Explanatory Variable Estimate (t-stat) P-value 
Firm performance -0.46228 0.647105 
Firm size 1.161549 0.2542845 
Economic indicator 0.053334 0.057808 
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Probabilistic model analysis indicates that the abovementioned variables have no 
explanatory power regarding the dependent variable: probability of occurrence of a 
company strike. This means that other factors have to be investigated using the model.
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results presented in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 presents a 
discussion of the results. Section 5.3 discusses the probabilistic model regression 
results. Section 5.4 concludes the study. 
 
5.2 Discussion  
The CAR for the event window was found to fluctuate between positive and negative 
for the days studied.  
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) attribute the decrease of the stock price at the 
announcement of a strike to: a strike is classified as ‘bad’ news and decreases the 
firm’s expected future cash flows and therefore the value of the firm decreases 
around the period of the strike and with it the stock price. 
 
It was noted earlier that SA strikes are predominately of short duration and therefore 
the company stock price decreases in value prior to the strike and post the strike but 
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the effect is short lived, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This is aligned with the finding of 
Nelson and Amoaka-Adu and Smith (1994) that strikes lasting only a few days tend to 
reduce the stock price. The phenomenon can be related to the costs and benefits of 
strikes.  
 
Pre-strike CAR (between day -14 and -1) is computed to be -0.00127 and statistically 
significant. According to Imberman (1979), pre-strike costs emanate from several 
different sources. The first type of pre-strike cost results from publicised 
disagreements between union leaders and management. Such conflicts commonly 
result in worker animosity and a corresponding decrease in work effort and worker 
concern for the finished product. The second type of pre-strike cost arises from 
companies finding it necessary to stockpile finished products in order to appease 
their customers who fear an interruption of supply. Such stockpiling usually involves 
paying a great deal of overtime pay to workers, incurring transportation costs to 
outside warehouses, and paying for the warehousing space itself. Standard costs of 
the second type outlined by Imberman (1979), costs incurred during the strike, 
include the obvious ones such as lost production, shipments, and revenues, and the 
cost of idle equipment. However, in addition, Imberman (1979) pointed out the less 
obvious cost of lost management time and salaries, as many companies assign 
managers to fill the voids left in production and shipping. Standard costs of the third 
type outlined by Imberman (1979) are longer-term costs that are experienced after 
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the strike is settled. These costs include the loss of trained employees who exit the 
firm during the strike and overtime expenses paid to replenish depleted inventories. 
Also, firms may lose future business as customers discover substitutes and alternative 
sources. 
 
The results of the industry portfolio are shown in Table 4.4. A statistically positive 
CAR is observed to be -0.0023 and -0.0382 for the mining industry portfolio and the 
general retailers’ portfolio, respectively. It is observed that most of the CARs for 
industry portfolios are statistically significant.  
 
The effect of a company strike is easily observable by analysing the reaction of the 
industry portfolio. The impact of the strike is highly correlated to the size of the 
firm/market share. The same reasoning applies in this case as well; company output 
decreases during the strike period. 
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5.3 Probabilistic Model Results 
The model tested the explanatory power of the following variables: 1) firm performance; 
2) firm size; and 3) economic indicator, with the probability of occurrence of a strike.  
 
The multi-variable regression indicates that all the specified variables do not have 
explanatory power over the dependent variable.  
 
The results are in direct contrast to the findings by Prais (1978) on the relationship 
between strike occurrence and firm size. Prais (1978) finds that the relationship between 
the percentage of manufacturing plants affected by an officially recorded stoppage and 
plant size, measured in terms of employment, is such that the likelihood of a plant being 
stoppage-free decreases with size. This tendency is gradual, but increases rapidly in the 
1 000 to 5 000 employee plant size range. Second, the average number of stoppages per 
plant per annum rises in almost direct proportion with size of plant. Third, the number of 
working days lost per plant per annum rises much more sharply than in proportion to 
plant size. 
 
In the SA context, it can be assumed that there are other factors at play that cause strikes 
to occur. The factors that could be considered include the SA political history. As 
discussed as part of the literature review, trade unions’ decisions are solely based on 
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rectifying the injustices of the previous political regime (apartheid) and on increasing 
union membership. This suggests that in SA strikes occur because trade union leadership 
fails to seek a mutually beneficial decision for the company and its members.   
 
In SA, a study by Hansen (1921) on the effect of cyclical movements of industry on strikes 
is challenged by the regression results for the current study. Hansen’s results suggest that 
if one can predict industry cycles then one can predict industry strikes. Industry strikes 
trend upward during ‘boom’ years (prosperity) because workers expect to share in 
company profits and the general price increase: living costs. SA remains an unequal 
society in numerous aspects but particularly prominently in wage discrimination.  
 
Univariate regression results suggest that the state of the economy (repo rate) of SA is a 
predictor of strike occurrence. Macroeconomic principles are re-validated by these 
results. Macroeconomic principles state that a decrease in the repo rate causes a 
decrease in the prime rate. Credit becomes easily accessible and increases consumer 
spending and consumer confidence. Prices gradually increase and workers eventually 
demand an increase in wages and generally strike occurrences increase. 
 
Analysing the CAR in Figure 4.1 shows the predictability of strikes in SA. The market 
reacts very slightly over the period immediately before a strike onset. Thus, there is some 
evidence that market participants are able to predict strikes. That likelihood is consistent 
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with the findings of Becker and Olson (1986). However, the strong negative return on day 
-4 shows that strikes are not completely predictable.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The findings of the study indicate that the market reacts to the news of a strike action 
approximately five days prior to commencement, which has been labelled as day 0. The 
effect prevails until day 5. Therefore, the stock prices deviate from the fundamentals and 
are influenced by investor sentiment during the event window, as illustrated by Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). Utilising the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) model it can 
be deduced that the JSE is an inefficient stock market but is indicative of a semi-strong 
market.  
 
However, one test of market efficiency is not sufficient to declare conclusively that the 
JSE is inefficient. Therefore, a second test can be performed using unit root tests to stock 
price indices to assess the efficiency.   
 
The traditional market model has been adjusted for industry. That is, the industry index is 
used as a benchmark and is specific to the industry and allows for a more accurate 
analysis of the ARs due to strike actions. Although the results of the study reveal a 
negative effect of strike actions on the stock returns, the following factors have to be 
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considered: i) the sample size is small and ii) the sample period is shorter than 10 years 
owing to the limited availability of data. 
 
Sample size is a concern because the t-statistics used in the event study framework are 
based on normality assumptions associated with large samples. Additionally, many event 
studies are based on long-event windows (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
 
The probabilistic model results are not conclusive as they exhibit the effect of 
heteroskedasticity. In the study lack of data for one omitted variable caused the model to 
reveal inconclusive results. Sample size and sample period also influence the results of 
the probabilistic model. 
 
Given SA’s political history and results from previous studies, it is believed that there is a 
correlation between trade union presence in a firm and the propensity to strike. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE 
 
COMPANY DESCRIPTION 
HAPS HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED 
GOGOF GOLD FIELDS LIMITED 
NPK NAMPAK LIMITED 
EHS EVRAZ HIGHVELD STEEL & VANADIUM LTD 
WOWOW WOOLWORTHS HOLDINGS LIMITED 
IMPO IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LIMITED 
PWK PICK N PAY HOLDINGS LIMITED 
SAB SABMILLER PLC 
TIIH TIGER BRANDS LIMITED 
CUL CULLINAN HOLDINGS LIMITED 
SHP SHOPRITE HOLDINGS LIMITED 
SHP SHOPRITE HOLDINGS LIMITED 
SUI SUN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
SAB SABMILLER PLC 
DRDD DRDGOLD LIMITED 
IMPO IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LIMITED 
IMPO IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LIMITED 
LOLMI LONMIN PLC 
DRDD DRDGOLD LIMITED 
NHM NORTHAM PLATINUM LIMITED 
PWK PICK N PAY HOLDINGS LIMITED 
SOL SASOL LIMITED 
SIIF SIMMER AND JACK MINES LIMITED 
RDI ROCKWELL DIAMONDS INCORPORATED 
MDC MEDI-CLINIC CORPORATION LIMITED 
UUU URANIUM ONE INC 
MSM MASSMART HOLDINGS LIMITED 
BHP BHP BILLITON PLC 
COM VODACOM GROUP LIMITED 
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APPENDIX B 
ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 HAPS GOGOF NPK EHS WOWOW IMPO PWK SAB TIIH CUL SHP SHP 
-14 -0.0004 0.01635 -0.0176 0.016588 -0.00838 0.001582 0.02891 2.4544E-08 -0.008996 0.03915 -0.00737 -0.0031 
-13 -0.002854 0.01704 0.01571 -0.00995 0.008656 0.00303 0.00953 -1.5803E-07 0.003523 0.015632 -0.01381 0.010581 
-12 -0.01424 0.01221 0.00317 0.027581 -0.00105 -0.006357 -0.0173 9.7394E-08 0.008485 0.031255 -0.04373 0.008661 
-11 0.019673 0.00768 -0.0058 0.012064 0.003423 0.012558 -0.0029 -3.5242E-08 -0.003307 0.030984 0.001155 0.002378 
-10 0.015628 0.00917 0.00608 -0.01638 -0.00535 0.016505 -0.0121 0 -0.0015 -0.02595 0.053015 0.010824 
-9 0.005384 -0.00066 -0.011 0.005763 -0.04607 0.026102 0.0065 1.1655E-08 -0.003879 -0.04205 -0.01875 -0.01052 
-8 0.02493 0.00603 0.00529 -0.00571 0.027659 -0.000776 0.01271 -6.6496E-08 -0.002273 0.024027 0.031021 -0.00703 
-7 0.002441 0.0068 0.00097 0.010598 0.021856 -0.024279 -0.0055 -5.2884E-08 -0.004065 0.063133 -0.03907 0.015901 
-6 0.014633 0.0232 -0.0111 0.000113 0.035943 -0.032172 -0.0229 1.5902E-07 -0.007478 0.06866 -0.0044 0.00428 
-5 -0.007351 -0.01951 -0.0331 0.004425 -0.02092 0.048366 -0.0138 -7.926E-09 -0.021126 -0.05004 -0.00564 -0.00663 
-4 2.5E-05 -0.00872 -0.0209 -0.00275 -0.00887 -0.024777 -0.0011 -1.6378E-07 0.008327 0.014519 0.000602 0.01192 
-3 0.030312 0.00483 0.01014 0.011431 0.004765 -0.021554 -0.006 2.0857E-07 0.011697 0.055072 -0.01797 0.003581 
-2 -0.007378 -0.00845 -0.0179 -0.02519 0.001843 0.037893 -0.0013 -3.6867E-08 -0.000462 -0.02609 -0.00225 -0.00618 
-1 -0.017587 -0.02101 0.01368 -0.00347 0.000449 0.039038 0.03795 -6.2859E-08 -0.008912 -0.05766 -0.00505 -0.02776 
0 0.004453 -0.02374 -0.0036 0.00668 -0.02544 0.073352 -0.0068 2.91E-08 -0.005913 -0.08819 -0.01259 -0.03793 
1 -0.010758 0.0091 0.005 0.006205 0.002306 -0.025572 0.01229 -1.715E-08 0.00025 -0.04239 -0.0031 -0.00527 
2 -0.03475 -0.02134 -0.0107 -0.01282 0.003613 -0.048804 -0.0068 -6.8448E-08 -0.018194 -0.03786 0.010581 0.029435 
3 -0.021679 -0.00835 -0.0084 0.113805 0.009639 -0.013326 -0.0098 5.0261E-08 0.00809 0.034416 0.008661 -0.01294 
4 0.006094 -0.00067 0.00964 -0.01029 0.008578 -0.020377 -0.0043 3.4483E-09 -0.002165 -0.03396 0.002378 -0.00547 
5 -0.024961 0.00802 -0.0141 0.012027 0.00233 0.028608 0.03096 -3.5551E-08 0.007334 -0.04435 0.010824 -0.02751 
6 -0.018484 -0.01838 -0.0151 -0.00687 0.003188 -0.015333 -0.0218 -3.7036E-08 -0.009029 -0.03303 -0.01052 0.001411 
7 0.009345 -0.00241 -0.0008 -0.01148 -0.006 0.017289 0.00476 1.3168E-08 0.007953 0.065612 -0.00703 0.024156 
8 0.014762 0.00748 0.00519 -0.00058 -0.0032 0.013854 0.03913 2.9229E-08 0.003572 -0.03938 0.015901 0.016512 
9 -0.009525 -0.02388 -0.0155 -0.00545 0.006237 0.000707 -0.0037 1.281E-07 0.002952 0.067032 0.00428 0.007617 
10 -0.005301 0.0024 0.01969 -0.0219 -0.00021 -0.059705 -0.0203 -2.0644E-07 -0.000479 -0.0066 -0.00663 -0.005 
11 -0.001628 -0.00259 0.0213 -0.00784 -0.01164 -0.023203 -0.0121 7.7166E-08 -0.003655 0.005421 0.01192 0.005937 
12 -0.032284 0.01855 -0.0022 0.032934 -0.01561 0.050772 0.01225 -5.386E-08 0.002191 0.023776 0.003581 -0.00264 
13 -0.023629 0.00034 -0.0146 0.015708 -0.01706 0.024188 0.00309 7.8851E-08 -0.009028 -0.16707 -0.00618 0.011278 
14 -0.003456 0.02053 0.0128 -0.01595 0.013959 0.021545 -0.0073 4.7143E-09 0.014532 -0.01222 -0.02776 -0.01686 
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  SAB DRDD IMPO IMPO LOLMI DRDD NHM PWK SOL SIIF RDI 
-14 3.895E-08 -0.0179015 0.02574376 -0.0011081 0.02226225 -0.0356331 0.02999382 -0.012448 -5.7E-08 0.0685631 0.01225895 
-13 -1.378E-07 -0.0259198 0.02632542 -0.0197745 -0.0032266 -0.0423363 0.02268695 -0.000429 -5.3E-07 -0.0157161 -0.0295232 
-12 1.468E-08 0.01630041 0.02028524 0.0071769 -0.0087246 -0.0142591 -0.0070651 0.0060056 2.45E-07 0.0203571 0.00677721 
-11 7.981E-08 -0.0160787 0.01623492 0.0209811 2.1034E-05 -0.0246273 0.00589464 0.0002058 -1.9E-07 -0.0027943 -0.3524627 
-10 -1.173E-08 -0.013315 -0.0014529 -0.015037 0.00611829 0.00655612 0.00052777 -0.018449 5.7E-07 -0.0223176 0.00350311 
-9 -1.523E-08 -0.0270261 -0.0161044 -0.0272525 -0.0079203 0.01958724 -0.0093412 0.00556 -6.7E-07 -0.0461724 0.06910513 
-8 2.774E-08 0.01150191 0.00531706 0.011997 -0.0151647 -0.0058635 -0.0020345 -0.00652 2.48E-07 -0.015842 0.05024669 
-7 -1.004E-07 -0.0035348 -0.0016357 -0.021169 0.00431316 0.01898214 0.02558433 -0.016262 4.3E-07 -0.0404292 -0.0144375 
-6 8.073E-08 -0.0307708 0.01080251 -0.0138803 -0.0071326 -0.0087504 0.011185 -0.004614 -4.8E-08 0.0067958 -0.0468619 
-5 1.248E-08 -0.0171044 0.01433509 -0.0090075 -0.0052101 0.01281004 0.0201731 0.0042905 -1.8E-07 0.013344 0.01385863 
-4 -4.718E-08 0.01318442 0.04371245 0.0038619 0.00196608 0.08496519 0.02330099 -0.0109 1.97E-07 -0.0162048 0.01943767 
-3 -3.45E-08 -0.0052948 -0.0011081 0.0379467 0.01131667 0.00849541 -0.0184922 0.0213243 -2.5E-07 -0.0320674 0.00269735 
-2 8.146E-08 -0.0157305 -0.0197745 -0.0235184 0.01670223 -0.0976038 -0.0164584 0.0005397 -3.4E-07 0.0167571 0.00491338 
-1 1.295E-09 0.00240683 0.00717691 -0.026893 -0.0097121 0.05625447 -0.0147638 0.0186919 2.73E-07 0.0127423 -0.0246813 
0 -3.953E-08 0.00819054 0.02098107 -0.0055022 -0.010491 -0.0500586 0.01066852 -0.006832 -2.8E-08 -0.0222069 -0.0476523 
1 4.104E-08 0.00141842 -0.015037 -0.0191899 0.00599909 0.00606128 -0.000128 -0.005876 -1.9E-07 0.0470936 -0.6079059 
2 -1.078E-07 0.00108132 -0.0272525 -0.0194312 -0.0054045 -0.0006174 -0.0234501 -0.003648 4.7E-07 0.0196132 0.01852976 
3 1.043E-07 0.02083064 0.01199705 0.0221557 0.00817588 0.00267942 -0.0110045 -0.005073 -1.2E-08 0.0799366 0.01890082 
4 -1.261E-08 -0.0153539 -0.021169 0.0063912 -0.0126117 -0.025328 0.00032527 0.0070096 -5.3E-07 0.0036729 -0.0118442 
5 7.545E-09 -0.0317679 -0.0138803 0.0205365 -0.000915 -0.0484255 0.02445366 0.0082625 1.73E-07 0.0043805 -0.0218957 
6 -5.589E-09 -0.0126582 -0.0090075 0.0086589 -0.0078244 -0.1637264 -0.0108739 0.0060069 9.51E-08 0.0033876 0.00527842 
7 1.654E-08 0.01887443 0.0038619 0.0108929 0.00128159 0.00905421 0.01221535 -0.000524 -3E-07 0.0010787 0.02759445 
8 4.835E-08 -0.0329625 0.03794674 -0.0050547 0.00877065 -0.0569213 -0.0157052 0.0154527 5.72E-07 -0.0057868 -0.0216735 
9 1.158E-08 -0.0356331 -0.0235184 -0.008922 0.00590275 0.01897577 0.01745465 0.0004524 -3.4E-07 -0.0050788 -0.0208887 
10 -1.546E-07 -0.0423363 -0.026893 -0.023263 -0.025178 0.03282358 -0.0187573 -0.021121 -1.6E-07 0.017414 -0.0107165 
11 7.164E-08 -0.0142591 -0.0055022 -0.0209724 -0.009315 0.02047345 0.00159422 0.0100416 4.34E-07 0.0163806 0.01984727 
12 1.15E-08 -0.0246273 -0.0191899 -0.0035104 -0.0019791 -0.0113496 -0.0001091 -0.004066 -3.2E-07 -0.0145217 0.05544956 
13 6.848E-08 0.00655612 -0.0194312 0.0142038 -0.0023791 0.03397251 -0.009978 0.0037166 1.81E-07 0.0114215 0.03966694 
14 -1.145E-07 0.01958724 0.02215568 0.003413 -0.0017963 0.03283002 -0.0168703 0.0115689 -3.4E-07 -0.0570352 0.15964592 
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 MDC UUU MSM BHP COM AVERAGE AR CAR 
-14 -0.0528054 -0.0251459 -0.0083261 -0.0078919 0.03624113 0.0034508 0.0034508 
-13 0.0165955 0.03224618 -0.0032328 -0.0306122 0.05944505 0.00113873 0.00458953 
-12 0.0579101 -0.1473652 -0.0061321 0.0336717 0.09926824 0.00228733 0.00687687 
-11 -0.0239344 -0.1081888 -0.0080275 0.0274914 -0.030096 -0.0151259 -0.008249 
-10 -0.0204837 -0.0034076 0.01258561 -0.0430798 -0.1307409 -0.0065449 -0.014794 
-9 -0.0076969 0.00622251 0.00626807 -0.0135008 0.03050462 -0.0026343 -0.0174283 
-8 0.0085068 -0.119196 -0.0237674 -0.0109786 -0.0216958 -0.0019786 -0.0194068 
-7 0.0211707 -0.162742 -0.0167533 0.0130532 0.01620416 -0.0028536 -0.0222605 
-6 -0.0130767 0.22817958 -0.0189953 0.0020985 -0.0568578 0.00311198 -0.0191485 
-5 -0.0412841 0.09183906 -0.0226087 -0.0086843 -0.0117216 -0.0021733 -0.0213218 
-4 0.0107986 -0.0808258 -0.0155129 0.0087913 0.00856873 0.00212519 -0.0191966 
-3 0.0004954 0.54079679 -0.003999 -0.0120894 0.00901579 0.02274932 0.00355271 
-2 0.0034415 -0.1256908 -0.0034586 -0.0171417 -0.0061949 -0.0124848 -0.0089321 
-1 -0.0574012 -0.1080702 -0.0208777 -0.0143842 -0.043635 -0.0088176 -0.0177496 
0 -0.0160123 0.23227156 0.00138909 0.0025719 0.00194371 0.00082619 -0.0169234 
1 0.0148402 -0.0351646 0.00463972 -0.057146 0.00284044 -0.0240085 -0.0409319 
2 0.0162034 -0.2832457 0.00763024 0.0138423 0.00573712 -0.0150255 -0.0559574 
3 0.0025173 0.02781749 -0.0180936 0.0019575 -0.0066411 0.00910184 -0.0468556 
4 0.0038222 0.00703569 -0.0065624 -0.0064622 0.02755457 -0.0031801 -0.0500357 
5 0.0038493 0.0730405 -0.00841 -0.0023197 0.01019824 0.00055998 -0.0494757 
6 -0.0155597 -0.080324 0.01341549 0.024238 0.06131495 -0.010501 -0.0599766 
7 -0.0223198 0.02043931 0.00448993 0.0227887 0.02924659 0.00700346 -0.0529732 
8 0.0045177 -0.0026935 0.01479423 -0.0349015 -0.1179189 -0.003505 -0.0564782 
9 0.0038055 -0.0704269 0.01760714 0.0130778 -0.0095012 -0.0017731 -0.0582513 
10 0.008633 -0.0649437 0.01946357 -0.0059815 0.10873587 -0.0054524 -0.0637037 
11 0.0122608 -0.1251511 0.0058753 0.0041583 0.00274546 -0.0033922 -0.0670958 
12 -0.0209615 -0.0143801 -0.0035461 -0.0011384 0.00275425 0.00071955 -0.0663763 
13 -0.0043755 -0.0187063 -0.0111094 -0.0006629 -0.008403 -0.0057363 -0.0721125 
14 0.0258343 0.02438033 0.00241746 -0.0102585 0.00069683 0.00746249 -0.06465 
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APPENDIX C 
REGRESSION OUTPUT 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.525002176        
R Square 0.275627285        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.248798666        
Standard 
Error 0.008748976        
Observations 49        
         
ANOVA         
  Df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 0.000786391 0.00078639 10.27363 0.003453805    
Residual 48 0.002066704 7.6545E-05      
Total 49 0.002853095          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 
-
0.002508565 0.001658155 
-
1.51286485 0.141932 
-
0.005910819 0.000894 -0.00591 0.000894 
X Variable 1 1.388610112 0.433229857 3.20525026 0.003454 0.499695881 2.277524 0.499696 2.277524 
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APPENDIX D 
PROBABLISTIC MODEL REGRESSION OUTPUT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT         
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.224867        
R Square 0.050565        
Adjusted R Square -0.04765        
Standard Error 0.339239        
Observations 60        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 3 0.177745 0.059248 0.514831 0.67531    
Residual 57 3.337407 0.115083      
Total 60 3.515152          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.828132 0.35824 2.311669 0.028098 0.095449 1.560815 0.095449 1.560815 
X Variable 1 -0.00038 0.000805 -0.46567 0.644933 -0.00202 0.001272 -0.00202 0.001272 
X Variable 2 5.04E-13 4.4E-13 1.146683 0.260886 -3.9E-13 1.4E-12 -3.9E-13 1.4E-12 
X Variable 3 0.001088 0.04096 0.026563 0.97899 -0.08268 0.08486 -0.08268 0.08486 
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APPENDIX E 
UNIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
REPO 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.009578672        
R Square 9.1751E-05        
Adjusted R Square 
-
0.032163354        
Standard Error 0.336721815        
Observations 60        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 0.000322519 0.000323 0.002845 0.957808    
Residual 59 3.514828997 0.113382      
Total 60 3.515151515          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.862006205 0.320064207 2.693229 0.011314 0.209231 1.514781 0.209231 1.514781 
X Variable 1 0.001963674 0.036818258 0.053334 0.057808 -0.07313 0.077055 -0.07313 0.077055 
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FIRM SIZE 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.204224        
R Square 0.041707        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.010795        
Standard 
Error 0.32964        
Observations 60        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 0.146607 0.146607 1.3491959 0.254285    
Residual 59 3.368544 0.108663      
Total 60 3.515152          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.842136 0.065486 12.85969 
5.7679E-
14 0.708575 0.975697 0.708575 0.975697 
X Variable 1 4.9E-13 4.22E-13 1.161549 0.2542845 -3.7E-13 1.35E-12 -3.7E-13 1.35E-12 
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PERFORMANCE 
SUMMARY OUTPUT        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.082744076        
R Square 0.006846582        
Adjusted R Square 
-
0.025190625        
Standard Error 0.335582534        
Observations 60        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 0.024066773 0.024067 0.213707 0.647105434    
Residual 59 3.491084742 0.112616      
Total 60 3.515151515          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.875499098 0.058849016 14.87704 1.16E-15 0.755475738 0.995522 0.755476 0.995522 
X Variable 1 
-
0.000337196 0.000729411 -0.46228 0.647105 -0.001824839 0.00115 -0.00182 0.00115 
 
 
